Savage [L. Savage,``The Foundations of Statistics, '' Wiley, New York, 1954] showed how properties of a decision maker's probabilistic beliefs can be deduced from primitive consistency axioms on preferences. This paper extends that approach and shows how logical properties of belief which underlie economists' models of information and knowledge can be related to properties of preferences. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D80.
Introduction
Savage [25] showed how properties of a decision maker's probabilistic beliefs can be deduced from primitive consistency axioms on preferences. 1 However the laws of probability theory are not the only properties of belief that are relevant for economists. More basic logical properties of belief underlie the concepts of``information'' and``knowledge'' used by economists. The use of partitions to represent information entails thè`p ositive introspection'' property that if something is believed, it is believed that it is believed, as well as other much stronger logical properties discussed below. It is a weakness of economic theory that standard ways of modeling information are never related to underlying decision theoretic axioms.
The purpose of this paper is to take the logic of the Savage approach one step further, and deduce such logical properties of beliefs, and rules for changing them, from preferences. It is possible to deduce properties of how article no. 0035 decision makers' beliefs vary across states of the world and through time by considering axioms on how decision makers' preferences (and thus their choices) vary across states and through time.
A decision maker is said to believe an event E if he is indifferent between every action which yields the same outcome whenever E is true. Thus belief is defined as a property of preferences. A decision maker is assumed to have a preference ordering over acts with uncertain consequences at every state of the world, and at every date. Thus at state |, I may care about what happens if state |$ occurs. But at state |$, I may have some different preferences over acts. The purpose of this paper is to consider, in this framework, the relation between properties of belief and properties of preferences.
This approach yields an immediate reward in the first result of this paper. The assumption that an individual's preference relation is always a complete ordering is shown to be equivalent to the assumption that the individual's system of beliefs is normal. Normality is the most basic logical property of a system of beliefs in the possible world semantics of Kripke [14] and Hintikka [13] . Suppose that belief is generated by an accessibility, or possibility, relation specifying which states are believed possible in which other states. An event E is believed at state | if E contains every state thought possible at state |. A system of beliefs is said to be normal if it can be derived from such a possibility relation.
In logical treatments of belief and knowledge, further properties of beliefs and knowledge (beyond normality) are added. In order to derive more substantive logical properties of belief, it is necessary to relate beliefs at different states of the world to each other and to the truth. Thus positive introspection requires that if something would be believed at every state that I think possible, then I must believe it. Negative introspection requires that if something would not be believed at every state that I believe possible, then I must not believe it. The knowledge axiom requires that if I believe something, it must be true. These three properties together have been shown to be equivalent to economists' standard assumption of an information partition.
The assumption of an information partition is necessary as long as the decision maker``understands'' the structure of the state space, so that we assume that part of his background knowledge is that he knows what he would have known at each state of the world. But there is no need to make that assumption and a number of papers in the economics literature have considered models where a decision maker's information is not represented by an information partition. 2 While the negative introspection assumption, 2 STEPHEN MORRIS say, can be objected to on various grounds, a weakness of this literature is that there is no decision theoretic foundation for alternative assumptions. In order to relate these more substantive logical properties of belief to properties of preferences, it is necessary to examine how preferences at different states of the world are related to one another. The preferences at each state of the world should somehow reflect the fact that it is the same decision maker at each state of the world. There should be a sense in which the decision maker as choices at each state of the world reflect some``metaordering,'' which represents that decision maker's preferences independent of the state of the world. Thus consider the set of``acts'' associating a consequence with each state of the world. Preferences are said to be coherent if there exists some meta-ordering over acts with the following property. Consider a decision problem that is, a finite set of acts available to the decision maker. Suppose that at each state |, the decision maker makes an optimal choice according to his state | preferences. An outside observer could calculate the consequence in each state of such optimal choices, which generates a new act. For coherence, it is required that that act is at least as good, under the meta-ordering, as any act which was available in the original decision problem. It will be shown that if preferences are coherent, then belief satisfies the knowledge axiom and positive introspection but need not satisfy negative introspection. It thus accords with a standard weakening of partition information in the philosophy and computer science literatures.
From the viewpoint of an outside observer, coherence is a normative restriction. When would the decision maker be better off by making choices which depend on the state via preferences at each state?``Better off '' is measured in ex ante terms, by the meta-ordering, relative to a constant (not state contingent) choice under the meta-ordering. But this normative interpretation must be with respect to an outside observer with access to the meta-ordering and an understanding of the state space not available to the decision maker. In the conclusion, I discuss why coherence is important in economic applications.
This analysis is extended to allow beliefs to vary through time. Say that beliefs satisfy valuable information if, in addition to being coherent, choices made at later dates always make the decision maker (weakly) better off under the meta-ordering. This property, which is the natural dynamic analog of coherence, implies refinement: if something is believed at some date, then it is still believed at all future dates. But it turns out to require more. As long as beliefs do not change, negative introspection is not necessary. But once beliefs change, it must be the case not only that you believe more as time goes on, but also that you believe that you did not believe those things you did not believe in the past.
Thus there are three main results of the paper, each giving necessary conditions on beliefs given that, respectively, preferences are normal, coherent, and satisfy valuable information. Each of these results is tight: examples in the paper show that stronger conditions are not necessary.
This work extends a line of research started by Geanakoplos [10] and followed by Morris and Shin [21] . Geanakoplos considered the impact of weakening the assumption of partition information in economics. Assuming expected utility maximization and Bayes updating, Geanakoplos showed that the knowledge axiom and positive introspection were necessary for information to be valuable, and that negative introspection was not necessary. 3 Morris and Shin derived analogous results for belief revision and showed that if Bayes updating is not imposed, the knowledge axiom and positive introspection are also sufficient for information to be valuable. This paper extends that work in two major ways. First of all, expected utility maximization need not be assumed for the results. The increased generality of the results is useful but less interesting than the new methods and perspective which dropping expected utility implies. We derive completely different kinds of proofs (not relying on the linear algebra of the expected utility proofs), and the more abstract interpretation of the results outlined above. The valuable information condition appears in a static setting as the coherence condition, and is thus reinterpreted as a restriction on preferences.
Secondly, the results in this paper are fully dynamic and provide an intriguing twist on the earlier work. When we generalize the valuable information condition to a dynamic environment, we partially reverse the conclusion from the earlier work that negative introspection is not necessary for valuable information. It is true that it is not necessary for this condition to hold contemporaneously. But it turns out to be necessary that if something was not believed in the past, then it must be believed now that it was not believed. In this sense, the departure from the assumption of partition information is small. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the framework for modeling and relating preferences and beliefs. Normal belief systems are shown to correspond to preference relations which are complete orderings. Section 3 introduces more substantive properties of belief and shows that the knowledge axiom and positive introspection are necessary for coherence. Section 4 presents a dynamic model of belief and shows that refinement and historical negative introspection are necessary for valuable information. Section 5 concludes. (Foundations) 
Static Preferences and Beliefs

Beliefs
Consider a fixed finite set 0 of``possible worlds'' or states. Take as a primitive representation of beliefs an``accessibility'' or``possibility'' relation: write |$ # P(|) if state |$ is believed possible when the true state is |. This way of modeling qualitative belief originates in the Kripke semantics for modal logic (Kripke [14] ) as developed by Hintikka [13] for epistemic logic.``Belief '' is used here in a non-probabilistic sense: it is analogous to``belief with probability one'' in probabilistic models. 4 Now P(|) is the set of states considered possible when the true state is |. An event is then believed if it contains every state considered possible. This suggests the following formal definition of belief. Thus if operator B represents a decision maker's possibility relation, we shall say that the decision maker believes event E at state | if and only if | # B(E).
Definition 2. The operator B is a normal belief operator if there exists a relation P such that B represents P.
The term normal is intended to draw a parallel with normal systems of modal logic in which the logic is sound and complete with respect to some version of the Kripke semantics. The following theorem is well known in other contexts (see Chellas [6] ) but is repeated and proved in this framework for completeness. The distributivity property states that event E is believed and event F is believed if and only if the event E & F is believed. The tautology property states that the universal event 0 is always believed. The theorem states that 5 THE LOGIC OF BELIEF if operator B represents a possibility relation (i.e., is a normal belief operator) then it satisfies these two properties. Conversely, if an operator B satisfies these two properties, then there exists a possibility relation which generates the operator. In fact, the following proof makes clear that that possibility relation is unique.
. Now suppose B satisfies B1 and B2. B1 implies the following monotonicity property:
Write &E for the complement of E in 0 and define P by
I will show that B represents the P constructed from it by (2.2). Suppose
The characterization of (2.2) is of independent interest: state |$ is thought possible at state | if and only if the complement of |$ in 0 is not believed.
Preferences
I now describe a decision maker's preferences. The finite state space 0 is given. As in Savage [25] , an individual has preferences over``acts,'' where an act determines a certain known outcome depending on which state of the world is realized. For simplicity, I restrict the set of outcomes to the real line, so that we can think of the decision maker receiving a money prize. Thus act x # R 0 gives a prize x | in state | # 0, where x | , is the | th coordinate of x. For event E/0, x E denotes the tuple At each state of the world, | # 0, the decision maker is assumed to have a preference relation, p | , over acts, with the interpretation that x p | y means that act x is at least as good as act y for the decision maker if the true state is |.
This approach to modeling preferences is quite novel and it will be useful to contrast it with two apparently related but distinct issues. A preference relation over acts is said to have a state dependent representation if the utility derived from a given outcome varies with the state. The preference relation p | , may or may not be state dependent in that sense (in examples later, we will for convenience assume that it is state independent). The | subscript in x p | y refers only to the fact that the decision maker would choose act x to act y if the true state was |. It has nothing to do with what his preferences would be if he knew that the true state was |.
Our usage also should not be confused with conditional preferences. Suppose a decision maker had preference relation p * over acts. If he was informed that event E was true, one can think of various rules for determining what his conditional preferences wouldÂshould be. Our approach is essentially the other way round. At state |, a decision maker's preferences are represented by p | . Any beliefs or knowledge of the decision maker are reflected in his preferences. Given these preference relations, we will later ask whether there is some meta-ordering of acts, p * , which the preference 
Beliefs and Preferenes
It is natural to define belief in terms of preferences as follows. If the decision maker's preferences never depend on anything that happens when event E does not occur, then the decision maker believes E. On the other hand, if the decision maker is ever concerned about what happens when E does not occur, then he cannot believe E.
Definition 4. Belief operator B reflects preference relations
for all x, y, z # R 0 .
Savage [25] informally defined knowledge in exactly this way. Thus a decision maker believes an event E (at |) if the complement of E is null (under p | ) in Savage's sense. Notice that any given belief operator reflects many preference relations. When no confusion arises, I will leave implicit the preference relations which a belief operator reflects.
I will be concerned how properties of preference relations are related to properties of belief operators. I first show how the standard axioms on preferences assumed above translate into standard logical properties of belief.
Theorem 2. If preference relations are completely ordered, then the belief operator representing those preference relations is normal.
It is also possible to show a converse result. For any normal belief operator B, there exist completely ordered expected utility preference relations such that B reflects those preference relations.
By Theorem 1, any belief operator which reflects completely ordered preferences represents a possibility relation. Equation (2.2) in Proof of Theorem 1 can be used to show that this possibility relation is
Expected Utility Preferences
One objective of this paper is to study the relation between belief and preferences without putting too much structure on preferences. In particular, the preference relation p | may or may not have an expected utility representation. But imposing standard axioms such as the sure thing principle on each relation p | would ensure an expected utility representation. 5 For simplicity, we will impose some additional structure. Suppose that the decision maker's utility function over outcomes depends neither on the true state nor on the state in which the outcome occurs. At each state |, he has some probability distribution over possible states. Thus at state |, he believes that the true state is |$ with probability $(|$ | |). This can be represented formally as follows.
Definition 5. Preference relations [ p | ] | # 0 have a (state independent) expected utility representation if there exists a strictly increasing and continuous utility function u: R Ä R and, for each state
In this case, the belief operator and possibility relation defined above are extremely natural. An event is believed if and only if it is assigned probability one, i.e.,
A state is considered possible if it is assigned strictly positive probability, i.e.,
Monotonicity and Continuity
The results of this paper remain correct, exactly as stated, if the expected utility assumption is made throughout. But the assumption is not made since the results do not rely on it, and the intuition is in some ways more transparent without it. In this section, however, I introduce regularity conditions on preferences (which are implied by, but strictly weaker than, expected utility maximization) which simplify the analysis. An earlier version of this paper (Morris [19] ) derived analogous results to those of this paper, without making these assumptions. 6 Write x y if x | y | for all | # 0, x>y if x y and x | >y for some | # 0; and xry if x | >y | for all | # 0. The following properties of a preference relation p will be assumed.
THE LOGIC OF BELIEF
P3 (continuity): The set [x # R 0 |xpy] is closed for all y # R 0 .
P4 (monotonicity)
These assumptions allow us to give an alternative characterization of the possibility relation P. The earlier characterization (Eq.
In the remainder of the paper, preferences are always assumed to satisfy P1 through P4.
Further Static Properties of Preferences and Beliefs
In the previous section, a decision maker was assumed to have preferences at each state of the world. Belief was defined as a property of those preferences. Various minimal properties of those preferences were related to certain minimal properties of belief. In this section, more fundamental properties of preferences and belief will be introduced and related together.
Further Properties of Belief
I first introduce the properties of belief operators which will be critical. This treatment of beliefs and knowledge was introduced into the economics literature by Milgrom [16] and Bacharach [2] ; more detailed discussion of the following material is available in the surveys of Aumann [1] , Bacharach [3] , Binmore and Brandenburger [4] , and Geanakoplos [11] .
B3 ( positive introspection 8 ): B(E)/B(B(E)), for all events E.
Beliefs are correct if whenever an event E is believed, it is in fact true. Knowledge is usually defined to be correct belief.
B4 (knowledge axiom 9 ): B(E)/E, for all events E.
Shin [26] showed that a decision maker's beliefs satisfy properties B1 through B4 if and only if belief is equivalent to a formal notion of provability. This system of beliefs known as (S4) in the logic literature strikes many commentators as excessively strong, leading to many attempts to weaken various of the axioms. However, it does not imply the following important additional property of belief.
B5 (negative introspection
10 ): &B(E)/B(&B(E)), for all events E.
One interpretation is that B5 allows the decision maker to make deductions about what state he is in from what he would have believed if he were not in the state he is in. Properties B1 through B5 can be translated into properties of the equivalent possibility relation. Discussion and proofs of Lemma 2 are available in the papers cited at the beginning of this section. 11 Lemma 2 shows that assumptions B1 through B5 imply that the decision maker's beliefs can be represented by a partition. To see why, note that B3 and B5 jointly imply
Some examples will illustrate these properties. 
Equivalent Properties of Preferences
In the next section, I will show that a certain coherence restriction on preferences is equivalent to properties B1 through B4. In this section, I first give a direct interpretation of the positive introspection axiom (P3) and the knowledge axiom (P4) in terms of preferences.
P5 (non-triviality): (x
Non-triviality requires that preferences at state | are sensitive to what happens at state |. This lemma is simply a restatement of the relevant definitions. Given preference relations [ p | ] | # 0 and event E, say that x p E y if xp | y for all | # E; and x o E y if x p E y and x o | y for some | # E.
P6 (extended sympathy
Extended sympathy requires that preferences at a given state are sensitive (in the most minimal way) to what preferences would have been at any state that is considered possible. Properties P5 and P6 were direct restatements of the equivalent belief properties. In the next section, a more subtle characterization is given.
Coherence
The coherence property introduced in this section is intended to be a minimal rationality requirement relating together preferences at different states of the world. Is it the case that the choices made at different states of the world can be seen as reflecting a true, metapreference ordering over acts? Let us first define what such a meta-preference ordering would look like.
Definition 6. A preference relation p is a meta-ordering if it is complete (P1), transitive (P2), continuous (P3), and satisfies the following strong monotonicity condition, for all x, y, z # R 0 :
I want to make a comparison between what would happen if a decision maker had such a meta-ordering and had to make a constant (not state contingent) choice in a decision problem and what would happen if he was able to make, at each state, a choice which was optimal given his preferences at that state (in the same decision problem). Is it the case that the decision maker is made no worse off (in terms of his meta-ordering) by being allowed to make state contingent choices? If this is always true (for every decision problem) then his preferences are said to be coherent. To state this formally, additional notation is required.
A Before proving the theorem, it is useful to consider some illustrative examples. The first exhibits some coherent preferences. To show that coherence is satisfied with this meta-ordering, consider any decision problem D and optimal decision rule f. Then, for any y # D, optimality of f (a) implies The logic of Example 3 generalizes, and it can be shown that for any belief operator satisfying the knowledge axiom and positive introspection, it is possible to construct coherent preferences such that the belief operator reflects those preferences (this is proved in an earlier version of the paper, Morris [19] ).
The following example illustrates why the knowledge axiom is necessary. 
. So coherence fails.
The following example illustrates why positive introspection is necessary for coherence. The decision maker is thus a risk neutral expected utility maximizer with the possibility relation of Example 2 (so beliefs satisfy the knowledge axiom but positive introspection fails). Consider the decision problem D=[x, 0], where x a ==, x b =&1, and x c =&= 2 . Now, whatever the values of : and ;, 0 is optimal at b. For all = sufficiently small but positive, 0 is optimal at a and x is optimal at c.
, for any meta-ordering p * . So coherence fails.
Note that this argument is true for any : and ;, and thus for any risk neutral expected utility maximizer with the possibility relation of Example 2. The following proof of Theorem 3 generalizes the logic of Examples 4 and 5 to non-risk neutral non-expected utility preferences.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose there exists p * satisfying the coherence property, but the knowledge axiom B4 fails. Then there exists a # 0 with a Â P(a). By continuity, it is possible to choose =>0 such that x o * 0, where x a =1 and x | =&= for all |{a. Consider the decision problem D=[x, 0]. Now a Â P(a) implies &= p a x; monotonicity (P4(iii)), implies 0o a &=; and so transitivity (P2) implies 0 o a x. Thus 
Dynamic Preferences and Belief
Now extend preferences to many time periods. Say there are a finite number of time periods, t=0, 1, ..., T. The individual's preferences in state | in time period t are represented by a relation on R 0 , p |, t , satisfying P1 P4. A belief operator, B t , at each date t is now naturally defined by
I write P t for the possibility relation which B t represents. Now I will say that beliefs satisfy a certain property of belief if each B t satisfies it. But further properties of belief dealing with how belief changes through time will also be needed. B6 (refinement): B s (E)/B t (E), for all events E and s t.
Belief satisfies refinement if you never revise your beliefs, so that anything believed at date s is still believed at any later date t. Thus belief only expands. This represents a very conservative notion of belief in which nothing is ever believed which will later not to be believed. Notice that belief satisfies refinement only if the equivalent possibility relations satisfy
The following dynamic restriction on preferences requires not only the coherence property of the previous section, but also that decisions made at a later date are more valuable (in terms of the meta-ordering) than decisions made at an earlier date. The approach here involves fixing the set of possible decisions, D, through time and comparing choices. One could also study changing decision problems, but the focus here is on changing preferences and beliefs, for given decision problems.
Generalize optimal choices and optimal profiles in the natural way:
P8 (valuable information):
There exists a meta-ordering p * such that for each finite D/R 0 , and each t=1, ..., T, there exists
As with coherence, if the decision maker knew enough to check this condition, he would presumably revise his preferences. But suppose there was a meta-ordering p * which represented the``true interests'' of the decision maker in a poorly understood world. What rules for revising preferences and thus beliefs would serve him well? Valuable information offers one minimal criterion for such rules: they should never make him worse off.
A natural conjecture might be that refinement B6 together with the earlier requirements of positive introspection B3 and the knowledge axiom B4 would be the only necessary conditions for valuable information P8. The following example shows that this is not the case. Assume for simplicity that preferences are risk neutral expected utility preferences (Proof of Theorem 4 generalizes the argument to arbitrary preferences). Suppose that the belief operators reflecting preferences represent the following possibility relations.
Belief satisfies positive introspection, the knowledge axiom, and refinement. But in the following decision problem, valuable information fails. Consider the decision problem D= [0, x] , where x a = &1, x b = &= 2 , and x c ==. Now for any given beliefs, for =>0 sufficiently small, act x will be strictly optimal with possibility set [b, c] and act 0 will be strictly optimal whenever the possibility set is [a, b, c] . Act x will also be strictly optimal whenever the possibility set is What goes wrong in this example? It is true that negative introspection fails. But negative introspection cannot be necessary for valuable information. Consider the case where preferences stay constant through time. In this case, the valuable information condition reduces to coherence, and Example 3 has already shown that negative introspection is not necessary for coherence.
It turns out that a subtle weakening of negative introspection is required. If, in state | at date s, you don't believe E, and if at state | at date t>s, you believe something more than you did at date s, then you must in particular believe that you didn't believe E at date s. This property will be labelled historical negative introspection. In defining it formally, the following lemmas will be useful.
Lemma 5. &B s (E)/B t (&B s (E)) for all events E if and only if
Proof of Lemma 5. The following statements are equivalent.
Suppose beliefs satisfy refinement (B6) and s<t. Then | # B t (E) & &B s (E), for some event E, if and only if P s (|){P t (|).
Proof of Lemma
for some E. Then P t (|)/E and P s (|) / 3 E and so P s (|){P t (|). K Historical negative introspection requires that the property of Lemma 5 holds exactly at those states where the property of Lemma 6 holds.
, for all events E and F, s t.
Let us compare this property with negative introspection. Suppose that you don't believe something at time s. Negative introspection requires that you believe that you don't believe it at time s. If beliefs satisfy refinement, then you will continue believe (in all future periods) that you didn't believe it. Thus if didn't believe something at time s, you believe that you didn't believe it from time s on. Historical negative introspection requires this same property (if you didn't believe something, you believe that you didn't believe it...), but this property must hold only once you have learned something you didn't know at time s. Thus as long as your beliefs remain constant, historical negative introspection is vacuous. But if you believe something new at every date, then historical negative introspection is equivalent to negative introspection with a one period lag. In this sense, historical negative introspection is a small weakening of negative introspection.
The following characterization of historical negative introspection is used in the proof. (2) Suppose valuable information, the knowledge axiom, and positive introspection hold but refinement fails. Then there exists s<t, a # P t (b), and a Â P s (b). Observe that (i) by positive introspection, 
. Thus a # P t (a)/P t (b) by the knowledge axiom; a # P s (b) by refinement; P s (a)/P s (b) by positive introspection, contradicting assumption.
Thus A, B, and C are mutually disjoint. The following properties will be useful:
, C=&P t (a), P t (a)/P s (a), and P t (a){P s (a)]. 
Conclusion
The central idea of this paper is that it must be possible to make a connection between preferences and the logical properties of belief and knowledge which underlie standard representations of information in economics. This connection is of interest whether one believes that a decision maker's beliefs and knowledge exist prior to his preferences, or if one is a pure subjectivist, who believes that all statements about belief and knowledge must be reducible to observed choices and thus preferences. With the exception of the independent work of Lipman [15] (discussed below) this paper is the first in the economics literature to pursue this approach.
This general approach must be distinguished from the particular direction which has been pursued. This paper follows a literature in economics which has examined the economic consequences of weakening partition information (see footnote 2). Modica and Rustichini [17] have argued that the forms of non-partitional information structures studied fail to capture the idea of``unawareness'' or unforeseen contingencies which was at least part of their motivation. Lipman [15] examines the consequences of weakening the more basic assumption implicit in the distributivity assumption (B1) in this paper that decision makers believe all the logical consequences of everything they believe. But whatever system of belief and knowledge is chosen for study, this paper has illustrated a general approach to relating that system to assumptions about preferences.
In defense of the particular approach of this paper, the results related standard weakenings of the assumption of partition information to natural properties of preferences. Because decision makers do not understand the state space, coherence, and valuable information cannot be thought of as normative rules for the decision maker. But from the viewpoint of an external observer, they test whether a decision maker's choices could be rationalized by an appropriate meta-ordering.
An additional rationale for studying the properties of preferences considered here was provided by Geanakoplos [10] . Many results in information economics rely only on the fact that ex post decisions do not make the decision maker worse off according to some appropriate ex ante criterion, i.e., in the language of this paper, they are coherent. For example,`n o trade'' theorems show that if there are no ex ante gains from trade then optimal ex post decisions, following the arrival of information, will not lead to trade. Coherence, and thus weaker non-partitional information structures, are sufficient for many economic arguments. On the other hand, the results of this paper show that in dynamic settings, nothing significantly weaker than information partitions will suffice for standard information theoretic results.
